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RADICAL RECONSTRUCTION: THE TEXAS CHOICE
by Richard Moore
On May 18, 1861, William Pitt Ballinger of Galveston, Texas, wrote to
Henry H. Williams of Baltimore, Maryland,
1 fear we have fallen on evil times. I shall never believe the disruption
of the Union was necessary. I was one of the 30 in Galveston who
voted against it. But there is no alternative now but to become
conquered subjects of the North, or fight for our independence to the
last gasp.'
His observation neatly capsulated the potential fate of Texas and the
Confederacy; and yet more than two years were to pass following the
Confederate surrender before the South became. in fact, a "conquered
province."
During this period, political leaders both north and south wrestled with the
constitutional questions raised by the war, and vainly tried a less drastic
alternative that would avoid the logical consequences of total military victory.
Such was the objective of the Lincoln-Johnson administration, an objective
which failed attainment because Texans, like other Confederates, ultimately
preferred the humiliation of being conquered to the expediency of being
contrite.
When viewed against the background of fOUf bloody years of fratricidal
warlare, the concessions originally sought by the victors seem reasonable, if
not innocuous. The right of secession must be denied; slavery ended; and
guarantees provided for the future loyalty of the people in the seceded states
with assurances that their new governments be organized by
non-Confederates. Had the North and South been two nations with manifestly
different systems of government, the task of reconstruction on the above terms
would have been easy enough, but such was not the case, for both shared the
same constitution which made no specific provision for revolution, and by the
prevailing Jeffersonian standards, reserved to the states the right to decide, in
large measure, the civil rights of their citizens. Under these circumstances.
two major questions had to be answered; could the state governments of the
South_be organized according to northern demands without doing violence to
accepted republican theories of government; and could the freedman be
guaranteed the civil rights which inured to his being set free? If military force
was used in lieu of democratic methods, many statesmen feared a dangerous
precedent would be set that would eventually destroy the republic. The
reliance on democratic methods, however, would require voluntary
acceptance of the lenient reconstruction proposals so that, in effect, the South
would be given the responsibility of making the choice. Its decision would
determine the course of reconstruction. 2
Texas should have been a select state to test the scheme of voluntary
reconstruction. Unoccupied by invading armies until after the war's end, her
territory was unscathed, and except for the scarcities imposed by the Union
blockade, her economy was still intact. Many of her political leaders looked
forward to surrender, and plans were confidently made to erect a loyal
government to greet the Union armies when they arrived. Some Texans felt the
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conscious humiliation of defeat, but in general, an aura of expectant optimism
prevailed. 3
This optimism caused leading Texas newspapers and prominent statesmen
to advocate cooperation with federal authorities rather than resistance. From
his prison cell in Fort Warren, Massachusetts, John H. Reagan, former
Confederate Postmaster. counseled Texans, "Your condition as a people is
one of novelty and experiment. involving the necessity of political, social, and
industrial reconstruction; after a sweeping and thorough revolution in all these
respects; and this is to be accomplished in opposition to your education.
traditional policy, and prejudices."4 P. W. Gray. former Confederate
congressman, declared that "Our effort, , , should be to restore our people and
our state to their constitutional relations to the federal government, and in good
faith regulate our institutions according to the radical changes which have
taken place."5
This cooperatIOn, it was thought, would be reciprocated by the newly
appointed governor, A.J. Hamilton, The Marshall Texas Repuhlican, wbose
editor. R.W, Loughery, was a former : 'fire eating" secessionist, suggested in
June 1865 that the new governor "by kindness and conciliation, and by
protecting the industrial interests of the State, can attach the people to him as
no other governor has before."6 The Texas State Gazette declared, "He has
been a wholesome check upon the rampant spirit of partisan contests for
political preferment-a balance wheel in the political machinery to whose
ability the people are indebted for much of the conciliatory spirit which
influenced them., .. "1 P,W. Gray wrote;o ... from my knowledge of Hamil-
ton, I do not apprehend vindictiveness. He will be conciliatory."~ In return for
an admission of defeat, Texans expected concessions from the victor in the
form of conciliatory rule.
The extend of further concessions they were willing to make was clearly
defined from the beginning and did not include an admission of guilt. Dr,
Ashbel Smith and William Pitt Ballinger announced this position to General
E.R.S. Canby when they went to Louisiana before the war's end to discuss
surrender terms. Texans, the General was told, did not feel "any regret for
their past opinions ... or offered any disavowal of them.'·9 His theme would be
echoed later by numerous county conventions which professed loyalty to the
Union, but insisted that secession and slavery were illegal as the consequence
of the "decision of the sword. "10 Texas Confederates were willing to admit
defeat-in this sense they were conquered-but their pride prevented them
from giving sign of contrition. They had revolted like the Americans of 1776.
"They succeeded, we failed," wrote Guy M. Bryan who asked, "Is failure a
crime in the eye of the liberal, refined, and educated?" 11 Governor Hamilton's
policy, ex-Confederate General J.F. Harrison thought, would not be to oppress
such men who had "acted honestly in defending long cherished principles." 12
Because he had fought for these principles, P.W. Gray did not "feel morally
guilty of crime or treason." He had only "violated that construction of the
Constitution and laws that was contended for."13 Under these circumstances
neither past nor future allegiance could be doubted. This kind of rationale made
it easy for Texans to take the loyalty oath in good conscience, although many
advocated the more practical reason of gaining control of local government.
Their apparent sincerity, ironicallY, would strain their relationship with
the comparatively mild provisional government of A.J. Hamilton, because
although the Governor did not seriously challenge the loyalty oaths or provide
an impediment to pardons, he was not hesitant to contrast the Texans who
fought for the Union with those who supported the Confederacy. "I have been
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willing to accord to many of those who gave their support to the cause of
Secession, honorable and patriotic motives," he said in his Address to the
People of Texas, "though candor obliges me to say that their perversion of
judgement filled me with ... astonishment. And I think that all right minded
men of that class ought now to be able to see they were deceived. "14 This type
of criticism, together with Hamilton's refusal to call for immediate elections to
choose a constitutional convention, eroded the early optimism of
ex-Confederates that a speedy return to the Union would occur without some
further concessions, and contributed to the exaggerated, but uniformly hostile
attitude held by most Texans towards the Governor.
The lack of any clearly designed reconstruction policy by either the
Johnson administration or the Congress further complicated Hamilton's task.
Lincoln's veto of the Wade-Davis Bill had left the responsibility for
reconstruction in the hands of the President, whose authority was based on his
constitutional role of Commander-in-Chief. The corresponding authority of the
provisional governor was unclear, because there was no definite delineation of
military and civilian duties, and because in the absence of fighting, continued
military activity could be interpreted as a violation of the basic tenets of the
Lincoln-Johnson reconstruction program. Ashbel Smith pointed out the
anomaly when he declared, "The surrender of our troops has made us all
citizens of the United States, and this is true whatever may have been our
wishes to the contrary."u In a democratic republic, could there be military
rule in peacetime?
For his part, Hamilton did not anticipate any trouble with the military
because he did not believe the determination of the relative jurisdictions of civil
and military tribunals to be in his purview. He knew that civil authorities alone
could not enforce the law, and that loyal citizens, particularly Negroes, could
not be given the protection of the courts without the presence of a military
force. Plainly, military authority superseded that of the provisional
government. "There is no Constitutional State Government," he wrote
General H.G. Wright. Therefore his government existed only at the will of the
President, and his authority as Provisional Governor was limited to those
measures necessary to write a new constitution and form a new government.
Only when this new government was accepted by Washington would military
authority be superseded by civilian authority. 16
Hamilton's practical interpretation of his role, in reality, conformed more
to the reconstruction theories of the radical Republicans than to those of
President Johnson. Like the radicals, he doubted the Johnson theory that the
goals of reconstruction could be fully achieved by voluntary action. Reports
coming from variou~ parts of the state convinced him that the verdict of the
war concerning slavery was not being accepted, and that freedmen were being
mistreated, sometimes murdered. 17 Accordingly, he had no objection to trial of
such offenses before military tribunals; on the contrary, he thought it was
mandatory. "The Government having declared the Negro free, is committed to
the protection of their freedom," he wrote. Should civil authorities alone be
entrusted with the protection of their civil rights, "the effort would be a farce at
best-possibly a tragedy," he warned. ls
Subsequent events would prove that the treatment of the Negro was the
litmus test for acceptable reconstruction governments, but several months
were to pass before Texan intransigence to the will of Congress became
sufficient to compel complete military control. Until then, Johnson's voluntary
submission theory had an opportunity to be tested. On June 25, 1865, Governor
Hamilton declared that the people of Texas were "invited to engage in the
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work of reconstructing local government for themselves," so that they could
"occupy by their own act, their former position in the Union. "19 As a first step
to restoring order, he made massive appointments of local magistrates.
depending only on the loyalty oath to separate unionists from unregenerate
Confederates. He had little choice. The functions of local government had
changed little since 1861, and, in effect. Hamilton's generous acceptance to
loyalty oaths and his generally uncritical support of applications for pardons
for Confederate office holders provided a continuity of gover::tment on the local
level sorely needed in the chaotic aftermath of the collapse of Confederate rule.
For most Texans, the Civil War had meant a change of government in title
only; their sheriffs and J.P.s remained the same.2:0 Obviously there were not
enough uncompromised Texas unionists to take their place, and in the few
instances where the attempt was made, the reaction was immediate and
hostile. "Consult the people over whom you appoint officers l and know their
wishes," a correspondent advised Governor Hamilton. "Do not be misled by
little, petty, lying, pretended union men l " he warned. 2 !
The willingness of Texans at the local level to submit to the victims of
voluntary reunion was of critical importance for President Johnson's moderate
reconstruction program. If they did not heed the advice of prominent Texans
like John Reagan, and if they succumbed to the racial arguments and appeals to
southern pride made by unreconciled Confederates, little chance existed for
democratically achieved reconstruction. Reports coming to Austin were not
encouraging. A.K. Foster of Halletsville warned Hamilton that the "rebels
know your kind l sympathizing disposition, and are banking on it ... to get
appointments from their own ranks under your authority." "Such men care no
more about an oath than a hog does about Sunday," wrote J.M. McAlphin of
Cass County. Hamilton's unionist supporters had little faith in their rebel
neighbors. "Conciliatory measures will not suit a majority of the citizens of
this country," Charles Ames wrote from Marion County, •'The plan is working
here now for the disloyal citizens to take the oath and beat the loyal citizen at
voting." A.A. Devalon wrote from Corpus Christi that his neighbors were
"welded to their idols ... They must know that we are masters, and masters
intend to be. "22 This pessimism was reflected in the reports Hamilton sent to
Washington. Most Texans seemed willing to obey the laws, were glad to have
the protection of the Government, and were anxious to accept every benefit it
conferred l he wrote President Johnson, "Still it must be confessed that a great
many, even of this class, have had their minds and their hearts to perverted by
past teachings that they accept the favor of Government as a matter of course
without feeling any corresponding obligations of their part to make the slightest
sacrifice to sustain the Government or its policy. "23 Burdened with such
doubts, Hamilton delayed eight months before calling for elections to choose a
constitutional convention.
The ensuing campaign for convention seats clearly revealed how far the
understanding of the essentials of Johnson's reconstruction program filtered
into the ranks of the populace. Their selection of convention delegates
demonstrated their reluctance to accept the leadership of Texas loyalists, and
the campaign rhetoric of the candidates revealed how far both secessionists
and pre-war unionists who served the Confederacy went to appeal to the
emotions of a people recently defeated in a war in which Texas loyalists were
the enemy. The Republican opponent of Sawyers A. Bradshaw for a
convention seat from Ellis County wrote Hamilton that Bradshaw was openly
championing his Confederate loyalty. "He came down with John Brown's raid,
Helper's Book, Sharp's Rifles ... and was cheered at Waxahachie till glass fell
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out of the windows." Guadalupe County voters elected unpardoned General
John Ireland to the convention, causing A.S. Wright to exclaim, "Pretty Logicl
Ireland engineered us out-he yet believes he was right-to be consistent we
elect him to engineer us back. "24 Ireland was not alone because in the ranks of
the secessionists elected were such prominent Confederates as H.R. Runnels,
O.M. Roberts, R.S. Walker, and T.N. Waul.
The extent the convention went to amend the Texas constitution to satisfy
the national congress was determined by its majority's own stubborn states'
rights principles and attitudes about Negro civil rights, and by the political
atmosphere In Washington, D.C., where President Johnson had already vetoed
the Freedman's Bureau bill and was taking a position against the Civil Rights
Acts and the Fourteenth Amendment. In his opening address to the
convention, Hamilton stated in mild terms what came to be considered the
radical position. The new constitution must guarantee the blacks their minima
of legal decency, "Justice required that this now despised race shall be
protected in the beneficial enjoyment of the great boon which has been
accorded them," he said, and warned, "Any system of laws, therefore,
intended to deprive them of the actual fruits ofliberty will meet with resistance
from the Congress of the United States." Asking that the convention take the
proper steps to restore peace and tranquility, he added that there was actually
little choice, because in the long run "the views of the nation" would triumph.
Because of the impression given to Washington, the governor also opposed the
convention membership of unpardoned Confederate generals,25
The call for black civil rights served to harden the conservative and radical
positions of the convention delegates, although ample evidence already was
available that the basic divisions were well-drawn before the convention
began. The Marshall Texas Republican editoralized on January 2, 1866
On the 7th of February, the State Convention will assemble at Austin.
Fresh from the people, and with full knowledge of the condition;
socially and politically, we trust they will proceed to organize, as
speedily as possible, a civil government. Until this is obtained, there
can be no security. The radical party, rendered insane by the power
which they have acquired and unjustly retained, and full of hatred to
the people of the South are prepared for fresh exactions. No
character. nor amount of self-abasement or humiliation by our people
will satisfy them. They are aiming at nothing short of our complete
prostration; and the transfer of the political power of these states to
the emancipated Blacks. 26
This public hostility to the alleged radical party was stated with just as much
vehemence in private by the soon-to-be President of the convention, J,W.
Throckmorton. "If the Southern states are not to be received back as equals in
every sense," he wrote S.H. Epperson on January 21, ", .. if they have to
send men to Congress who left the country in the hour of distress, why surely
we had better not be represented." As for civil rights for the blacks, he thought
that their right to testify in courts, "would be an entering wedge to sitting on
juries, suffrage, and finally to perfect social and political equality." On the
subject of constitutional amendments, "I have made up my mind to oppose any
changes except those required of a degraded and fallen people. "27
The debates of the convention served as a sieve to filter out the radicals
from the conservative ranks. In broad classification, the delegates represented
three pre-war political groups: Texas unionists who opposed secession and
either fought for the Union or refused service in the Confederacy; Texas
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unionists who opposed secession, but for various reasons supported the
Confederacy; and Texas secessionists. Conceivably, a coalition of
anti-secessionists could have been strong enough to make the necessary
changes in the constitution and form a government with policies and leaders
acceptable to the national congr~ss. A test case for their combined strength
came early in the convention when a resolution was introduced to declare the
Ordinance of Secession void ah initio; that is, secession was void from the
beginning. The defeat of the resolution indicated that the convention was
controlled by the secessionists forces who, when the debates over Negro civil
rights began, quickly received within their ranks the quondam unionists. "The
Paschal or administration party, are a unit, and will I think go lengths if they
could, that our folks (Union men as they claim to be) would repudiate, and they
would turn to us 'fire eaters' for protection against all kinds of radicalism,"
R.S. Walker wrote from. the convention. The Paschal forces he referred to
were those led by James .A. Paschal, A.H. Latimer, William M. Taylor, and
A.P. Shuford." The opposition leaders were publicly reported to be
secessionists, J.W. "Smoky" Henderson and Judge a.M. Roberts, and
pre-war unionist John Hancock. Convention President J.W. Throckmorton
was reported to be supporting the latter. 29
The results of the convention conformed with what the majority of the
members considered to be President Johnson's minimum requirements. and
taken at face value, the newly amended constitution could be described as
progressive. The civil rights it allowed freedmen did not substantially differ
from the privileges granted by the United States constitution; in fact, more
specific rights were delegated by the Texas constitution than by the
pre-fourteenth amendment national document. With few exceptions, the
convention delegates who were considered radicals, including E.J. Davis and
J. W. Flanagan, signed the document. However, the subsequent contest for
governor, held against the background of the intlamatory battle in Washington
between the unyielding President Johnson and the Republican controlled
congress, made the results of the convention deliberations irrelevant. The
opposing camps formed at the convention quickly identified either with the
radical Republicans, or with President Johnson and his supporters in the
North, and the highly exaggerated rhetoric of the summer campaign to elect
state officers reflected the desperate battle engaged in Washington where
Johnson's fate became tied inextricably with that of the reconstructed Texas
government,30
After some early support was elicited for John Hancock 3:nd B.H.
Epperson, a coalition ·of ex-Confederates formed the Conservatlve- Union
ticket, naming J.W. Throckmorton and George W. Jones to be candidates for
governor and lieutenant~governor respectively. Their choice of the title
"conservative" was particularly useful, for their opponents would be more
easily associated with the "radicals" in Washington. and because the normal
political usage of the term was broad enough to include pre-war Democrats and
Whigs. A conservative became one who opposed "radical" reconstruction,
and who did not abandon his patriotic identity with the Confederate South,:H
"Rebellion and Treason," P.W. Gray wrote. "are growing to be considered
most favorable virtues. "32
The political rewards for these virtues were not overlooked by J.W.
Throckmorton. He c"arefully aligned himself with southern nationalists during
the constitutional convention, and appealed to southern pride during the
course of the campaign.:!:! His strategy was well conceived, although his
victory was pyrrhic. Twenty-two delegates to the convention publicly
endorsed him. They came both from the ranks of the anti~secessionists-John
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Hancock-and the secessionists-O.M. Roberts, and they all voiced a
common theme: they were standing with President Andrew Johnson in the
battle to save constitutional government. In a newspaper advertisement
circulated throughout the state they announced their support for
Throckmorton because he backed President Johnson's policy of restoration
which was "based on the constitution." They knew he was opposed to Negro
suffrage and "the hasty and inconsiderate elevation of the Negro to political
equality." The opposition in Texas, they claimed, were adherents of the
radical branch of the Republican Party in the North "who have declared their
intention to reduce us to a condition of territorial vassalage, and to place us
below the level of those who were once our slaves." These Texas radicals, it
was charged, "are determined to aid and abet Stevens, Sumner, and Phillips in
their opposition to the policy of the PresidenUH Their names, thirty-four of
them, were published in the Marshall Texas Republican "in order that our
readers may be advised of who these extreme radicals are," and included E.M.
Pease, the Republican candidate for governor. 3~
The political stance of the Pease-Flanagan ticket differed little from that of
provisional Governor Hamilton. "No people in the world were ever suddenly
placed in a more trying and embarrassing situation than we now are," Pease
thought. The Negro had to be treaded as a freedman "in regard to all personal
rights," and if the state constitution and laws were not framed on that basis, he
warned, military and not civil authorities would exercise jurisdiction.36 "The
old secession politicians are very active against me," he wrote his daughter,
"and if the people still follow their consels [sic], I shall be defeated." The vote
count was 49,277 for Throckmorton to 12,168 for Pease-"about the same as it
was in 1861 for secession," Pease remarked. 37
Throckmorton's victory was obviously a triumph of the political forces in
Texas who aligned themselves with Andrew Johnson, and their subsequent
behavior rightly or wrongly identified the President with the unrepentant
ex-Confederates in Texas. Secessionists a.M. Roberts and David Burnet were
elected to the United States Senate; Governor Throckmorton stoutly opposed
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment and the presence of the Freedman's
Bureau; and the military occupation forces were confronted with increased
numbers of charges of atrocities committed against freedmen. When Johnson's
political fortunes reached their nadir with the start of impeachment
proceedings, Texas shared a similar fate. In August, 1867, Governor
Throckmorton was removed from his elected position by General Philip
Sheridan, and E.M. Pease was appointed in his stead.
The experiment in voluntary submission begun by Abraham Lincoln was
ended. To many Texans it marked the "triumph of the military, and the death
of civil government. "3R Governor Pease had a different opinion. "The great
majority of the white population of our state seemed to have profited very little
from their past experience," he said in his inaugural address. The alternative to
their control would be "a new coalition of loyal whites and blacks," he
forecasted. 3D
The new coalition did not represent the majority of Texans, most of whom
had supported the Confederacy, but it did represent the majority of the national
electorate as the elections of 1868 were to show; a majority which would
ultimately be the judge of the proper use of the constitution.
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